Tuesday, October 04, 2005

Links between 'Moslem militants' and the security services.


Allegedly, 'Extremist Moslem' groups can be used

(1) to carry out terror attacks which undermine the enemies of the Pentagon and the Indonesian military

(2) to discredit moderate Moslem parties

(2) to prop up fascist regimes.


Peter Symonds, at WSWS, 12 November 2003, wrote about links between Indonesia's 'militant Moslem' organisations and the security services, including the CIA.

The 'extremist' Moslem groups include Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam and Masyumi.

Symonds points out:

1. Masyumi’s leaders took part in a CIA-backed rebel government on Sumatra in 1958-59.

2. In the 1940s, a Masyumi politician founded the Darul Islam movement.

Masyumi and Darul Islam backed the CIA-orchestrated coup in 1965-66 and took part in the massacre of an estimated 500,000 workers and villagers.

3. According to Dutch academic Martin van Bruinessen: “It is widely believed that the powerful intelligence chief Ali Murtopo... cultivated a group of Darul Islam veterans and allowed them to maintain a network..."

4. In 1962, the Saudi regime 'established the Islamic World League as a vehicle for its own brand of Islamic fundamentalism, Wahhabism, to prop up its autocratic state'. In Indonesia, the League had links to Masyumi.

Abu Bakar Bashir became a leader of a student group connected to Masyumi.

Bashir had connections to an armed group known as Komando Jihad or Jemaah Islamiyah.

According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, intelligence chief Murtopo conceived of an elaborate sting operation using his contacts with the Darul Islam movement.

The intelligence agency BAKIN actively encouraged the formation of Komando Jihad.

One government aim was to use Islamic militants to discredit Islamic political parties and organisations.

In mid-1979, Komando Jihad member Haji Danu Mohamad Hasan blurted out in court that he had been recruited by BAKIN.

5. From his base in Malaysia, Bashir's group provided recruits for the CIA in Afghanistan.

'Either directly, or indirectly through Pakistani and Saudi intelligence, the CIA undoubtedly retained contacts with its Afghan “assets” long after the end of the Afghan war.'


6. Sometime in 1993, Bashir founded Jemaah Islamiyah.

In the 1990s, Suharto enlisted the support of various Islamist groups as a prop for his increasingly fragile regime.

, the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the World of Islam, had close links to Suharto.

KISMI championed “Islamic causes” such as the oppression of Muslims in Bosnia and Chechnya.
Suharto stepped down in May 1998.

KISMI and other rightwing Islamist groups 'backed the president to the bitter end'.

7. After Suharto was ousted, they supported President Habibie, a friend of the Suharto family.

In November 1998, Habibie used a special parliamentary session to consolidate his grip on power. KISMI helped organise his defence. 'It provided most of the 100,000 “volunteers” - thugs armed with batons and knives - who, along with army troops, intimidated and attacked huge protests demanding Habibie’s resignation and genuine democratic elections'.

8. 'As the protest movement waned, the military deliberately fomented communal conflict as a means of reasserting its authority.'

The army was 'involved in the promotion of sectarian violence in the Malukus and Sulewesi in 2000'.

9. Bashir and other JI members returned to Indonesia in 1999. Bashir established the Mujaheddin Council of Indonesia (MMI).

The MMI recruited its own militia units and dispatched them, with the tacit approval of the military, to take part in communal fighting in the Malukus, which claimed an estimated 5,000 lives.

10. On Christmas Eve 2000, a coordinated series of bomb blasts took place across the country. More than 30 bombs were set to explode at the same time at Christian churches or the homes of clergy in 11 cities in six different provinces. Nineteen people were killed and around 120 were injured. Two years later, the Bali atrocity occurred.

' It is simply not plausible that Indonesia’s vast security and intelligence apparatus knew nothing about the large logistical operation involved in the Bali bombings. Yet no investigation has been carried out into precisely what information military officials had prior to the attack. Any leads casting suspicion on the TNI—including the detention of a military officer—have been quickly dropped...

'Sections of the military have several motives for staging a spectacular terrorist attack, or allowing one to take place, including creating a justification for greater US military aid and cooperation, which is currently subject to a US Congressional ban'.



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